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WILLFUL BLINDNESS, PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY AND
TIPPEE LIABILITY:

SACS, STEVEN COHEN, AND THE

COURT'S OPINION IN

DIRKS

JOAN MACLEOD HEMINWAY*
The lengthy insider trading investigation involving SAC Capital Advisors,
L.P. and certain of its affiliates ("SAC"), together with SAC's prosecution
emanating from that investigation, have been leading business stories in the news
in recent months. Despite settling civil charges with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), SAC has been indicted on insider trading charges.'
Although SAC originally pleaded "not guilty" to those charges,2 SAC recently
revised its plea to "guilty" and is awaiting judicial approval of the plea and related
terms.' SAC's founder and owner, Steven A. Cohen ("Cohen"), manages and
controls the trading activities of SAC4 but is not named as a defendant in the
* W.P. Toms Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law; J.D.,
New York University School of Law; A.B., Brown University. The original draft of this essay was
prepared for use in a discussion group session convened at the Southeastern Association of Law
Schools 2013 Annual Meeting. I want to express my thanks to Jennifer Arlen and to the
participants in that discussion group session (including John Anderson, Miriam Baer, Jill Fisch,
Gerry Moohr, Donna Nagy, Ellen Podgor, Elizabeth Pollman, Charles Pouncy, and Jeanne
Schroeder) for their insights and suggestions.
1 See general!y Indictment, United States v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P. et al., 13 Crim. 541
(S.D.N.Y.
July
24,
2013),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July1 3/SACChargingAndSupportingDocuments
/SAC/ 20Indictment/o20(Stamped).pdf; Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI Assistant Director-InCharge Announce Insider Trading Charges Against Four SAC CapitalManagement Companies and SAC
Portfolio
Managers
(July
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/Julyl3/SACPR.php.
2

25,

2013),

See Bernard Vaughan, SAC Capitalpleadsnot guily to insider-tradingcharges, REUTERS (July26, 2013,

12:42
PM),
idUSBRE960OSD20130726.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/26/us-sac-fund-charges-

3 See Peter Lattman & Ben Protess, SAC CapitalAgrees to PleadGuilty to Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (November 4, 2013, 11:08 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/sac-

capital-agrees-to-plead-guilty-to-insider-trading/?

r=0.; Ben Protess, SAC Pleads Guilly, Then Judge

Calls a Timeout, N.Y.
TIMES
DEALBOOK
(November
8,
2013,
8:37
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/sac-capital-pleads-guilty-then-judge-calls-a-timeout/.
4 See Corrected Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 203() of the

Investment Advisors Act of 1940 and Notice of Hearing, Steven A. Cohen Release No. IA-3634,
2013
WL
3776681,
at
*1
(July
19,
2013),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/itigation/admin/2013/ia-3634.pdf (describing Cohen as "the founder and
owner of hedge fund investment advisers that bear his initials (S.A.C.) and that until recently
47
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indictment. The SEC has, however, brought administrative proceedings against
Cohen for a failure to supervise employees who used material nonpublic
information and allegedly illegally used that information in making trades for
SAC.'
Although the facts associated with the SAC insider trading allegations
have not been firmly established, the scuttlebutt in the news is that Cohen has not
been indicted or pursued in a public civil enforcement proceeding for insider
trading violations because there is insufficient evidence that Cohen violated U.S.
insider trading laws.6 The published facts do not indicate that Cohen is an actual
or constructive insider of the firms about which information was received and
possessed at the time SAC made trades in related securities. Published facts also
do not indicate that Cohen is an outsider who breached a duty of trust and
confidence owed to the source of information possessed at the time of a related
securities transaction. Rather, Cohen allegedly received material nonpublic
information from insiders in his firm-SAC-who had received that information
improperly from others
These SAC insiders were in possession of the
improperly obtained information when they engaged in securities trading related
to that information-trades that were allegedly controlled and financed by
Cohen.s In other words, Cohen is a possible insider trading tippee (if he is, in
fact, an insider trader at all).
Tipper/tippee liability for insider trading in the United States is actionable
under Rule 10b-5,9 adopted by the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended (the "1934 Act"). 10 The basic framework for tippee liability
under Rule 10b-5 was established in Dirks v. SEC, a Supreme Court case decided

managed portfolios of over $15 billion" and stating that Cohen "founded, owns, and controls
investment advisers whose names bear his initials, including S.A.C. Capital Advisors, LLC").

sSee generaly id.
6

See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld et al., SAC Capital's Steven Cohen Expected to Avoid Criminal Charges,

WALL

ST.

J.,

July

4,

2013

at

C13,

available

at

http://onhne.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323899704578585953480399358
(reporting that "U.S. prosecutors have concluded that they don't have enough evidence against
hedge-fund billionaire Steven A. Cohen to file criminal insider-trading charges against him before
a July deadline ...").
7 See Indictment, supra note 1.
8Id.

9 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
10 15 U.S.C. %§78a-78pp (2012).
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thirty years ago." Under Dirks, a classical tippee is liable for insider trading if the
tipper conveys material nonpublic information to him or her or it improperly-by
breaching a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence to the
12
shareholders of an issuer of securities.
[F]or Rule 10b-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure is improper
only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts duty. Thus, a tippee
assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not
to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider
has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing
the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should
know that there has been a breach. 3
The Supreme Court cites to an opinion in an SEC administrative action for
support: "Tippee responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility by a
necessary finding that the tippee knew the information was given to him in breach
of a duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the
information."' 4
Accordingly, under Dirks, a tippee may violate U.S. insider trading law
when he or she trades on the basis of, or re-tips, information received directly or
indirectly from an insider who breaches the requisite type of duty f the tippee
knows or should have known of the breach." This means that a public or private
enforcement agent alleging a tippee violation must effectively establish four
essential things relative to the vital breach of duty component of an insider
trading action: (1) the tipper's duty of trust and confidence-a duty to disclose all
material nonpublic information or abstain from trading in the issuer's securities;
(2) a breach of that duty; (3) the tippee's knowledge of that duty; and (4) the
tippee's knowledge that the duty was breached in conveying the information. 6
This is a tall order.

" Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
12 Id. at 660-61.
13Id. at 660.

14Dirks,463 U.S. at 661 (quoting In reInvestors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971)).
15See id.
16

See id. at 659-61.
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Based on what we know today, what among these substantive elements
relating to the essential breach of duty is troublesome in constructing an insider
trading case against Cohen? Although I am sure defense attorneys would attack
the sufficiency of evidence with respect to each substantive element of the claim,
I fixate on whether, given published facts about Cohen and the way in which SAC
conducts its business, Cohen ever knew or should have known the origin of the
information on which trades were based. In other words, was Cohen aware that
the people who shared information with Cohen's employees-even if not with
Cohen himself-breached duties of trust and confidence to corporate
shareholders by sharing the information? "Expert network" insider trading cases
(legal actions alleging insider trading in securities trading firms built around
interconnected relationships of industry and securities trading professionalsexpert networks-that receive and use information 7 ) tend to raise this question."
SAC, as a firm, reportedly uses expert networks in its operations. 9 Did Cohen
know, or should he have known, the provenance of the information that
supported SAC's trading decisions and profits?2"

17

Allyson Poulos et al., Securities Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1479, 1557-58 (2013) ("Recent

insider trading prosecutions have also focused on the use of expert networks. Expert networks
are consulting firms that connect large investors with industry executives, often in the technology
or healthcare industries. These experts are paid to help money managers and investors understand
a particular field.").
18

See Rita Glavin et al., The Expanding Scope of Insider Trading Liability, SEC'S LITIG. INSIGHTS

(Winter
2011),
available
http:/ /www.velaw.com/resources/ExpandingScopelnsiderTradingLiability.aspx.

at

Research analysts at investment firms may be unaware of whether the information they
are researching and obtaining is material, let alone whether the information originated
from a source that was obligated to keep the information confidential. Likewise,
investment professionals who rely on the information provided through the expert
network firms-which can be several sources removed from the information-may be
equally unaware about the source and import of the information. They may also
consider the information they receive from consultants to be immaterial, or they may rely
on representations by the expert-network firm that the information to be shared by
consultants does not violate any confidentiality duties.
Id.
19 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Knowledge Is Money, but the Peril Is Obvious, N.Y. TIME'S DEALBOOK
(Nov. 26, 2012, 9:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/knowledge-is-money-butthe-peril-is-obvious/.
20

This same question is being asked about one of Cohen's colleagues, Michael Steinberg, a

portfolio manager at SAC. See Christopher M. Matthews & James Sterngold, High Stakes in Trial of
SAC
Manager,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Nov.
14,
2013,
7:56
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303789604579198010436644946 ("'The
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In terms of actual knowledge, SAC's business model may have kept
Cohen purposefully in the dark about the origins of information possessed by his
analysts and traders.21 Information received by analysts in a securities trading firm
may or may not be passed on to a principal of that firm in the same form in
which it was received (since analysts are charged with synthesizing and otherwise
processing information), and even if it is, facts about the source(s) of the
information that would be relevant to insider trading liability may not be
conveyed to the principal. Cohen may have had no actual knowledge of any
informant's duty or breach of duty.
This still leaves open the possibility, however, that Cohen should have
known that the information relevant to the trade was received from an insider who
breached a duty of trust and confidence in conveying the information.2 2 The
content of this obligation or duty to know the origin of information and the
circumstances in which the information is given and received is sketchy at best.
But it is not a fait accomp/i that the law requires a trader to actually ask where
information comes from. Cohen's portfolio managers and other employees were
hired to ferret out information and suggest and make trades taking that
information into account. Can the principal of a securities trading business turn a
blind eye to the methods used to acquire information used in the business,
especially if he or she has reason to suspect that disclosure of the information was
improper, or is there a duty to inquire under the Dirks Court's legal standard?
Under current U.S. Supreme Court opinions, a principal may be able to
remain ignorant about the source of information used in trading on his or her or
its behalf and avoid liability for insider trading.23 However, the opinion in a

central question,' Mr. Berke wrote in a court filing, 'is whether Mr. Steinberg knew that certain
pieces of information provided by Mr. Horvath were obtained illegally."'). Steinberg was being
tried for insider trading when work on this essay was completed.
21 See Sorkin, supra note 19.
22 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 ("[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when.., the tippee knows or should know that
there has been a breach." (emphasis added)).
23 A recent federal district court opinion acknowledged this possibility, noting specifically that it
may be difficult to prove that a remote tippee knew of the tipper's breach of duty (shown by the
receipt of a benefit by the tipper). See U.S. v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
("[O]ne can imagine cases where a remote tippee's knowledge that the tipper was receiving some
sort of benefit might be difficult to prove. If, however, this is an unfortunate "loophole," it is a

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 15

recent case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, SEC v. Obus, 24

casts doubt on the ability of a securities trading firm principal to effectively avoid
insider trading liability on that basis. In Obus, the Second Circuit opined that a
negligence standard guides the determination of whether an alleged tippee should
have known that the conveyance of the information constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty (making the conveyance "improper" and an appropriate basis for
insider trading liability). The Obus court noted that the assessment of what a
tippee should have known involves "a fact-specific inquiry turning on the tippee's
own knowledge and sophistication, and on whether the tipper's conduct raised
red flags that confidential information was being transmitted improperly."2
Under a negligence standard, the receipt of specific kinds of information in
certain factual contexts by an alleged secondary tippee like Cohen, who has
significant knowledge and sophistication, is more likely to result in a
determination that the secondary tippee should have known that the informant
(tipper) breached a duty of trust and confidence by improperly conveying facts to
an employee of the firm (primary tippee).
As a general matter, however, insider trading liability, a form of securities
fraud liability, requires scienter-an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud;
negligence alone is insufficient as a basis for liability.26 Scienter may be based on
reckless conduct as a form of intentional conduct.27 The Obus court, mindful of
the precedential value of Ernst & Ernst, reconciles the tension between its
negligence standard and the scienter standard in Ernst & Ernst?' by applying a
negligence standard to the tippee's knowledge of a breach of duty and a scienterbased (knowledge or recklessness) standard to the tippee's engagement in trading
or re-tipping while in possession of material nonpublic information. "Thus," the
Obus court rules, "tippee liability can be established if a tippee knew or had reason
product of the topsy-turvy way the law of insider trading has developed in the courts and cannot
be cured short of legislation.").
24

SEC

25

Id. at 288.

26

V.

Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012).

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfedler, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) ("Although the extensive legislative

history of the 1934 Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent, we think the
relevant portions of that history support our conclusion that § 10(b) was addressed to practices
that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct
alone.").
27
28

Id. at 193 n.12.
See Donald C. Langevoort, 'Fine Distinclions" in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013

COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 429, 448 (describing the root of this tension in the Dirks Court's use of
"know or should have known" rather than a standard employing knowledge or recklessness).
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to know that confidential information was initially obtained and transmitted
improperly (and thus through deception), and if the tippee intentionally or
recklessly traded while in knowing possession of that information. '29 A recent
student-authored law review article appropriately questions whether this analytical
separation is tenable in application, concluding that the Obus opinion, in effect,
imposes a negligence standard on tippee liability (in contravention of the Court's
opinion in Dirks)."
If the Ernst & Ernst opinion is to retain its original meaning, Obus cannot
be right. In Ernst & Ernst,the Court makes clear that it is concerned about more
than intentional or reckless trading in ascertaining the appropriate state of mind
for an insider trading violation under § 10(b). At the heart of the Ernst & Ernst
Court's concern is the deceptive, manipulative, or fraudulent intent of the alleged
violator. "In this opinion," the Court writes, "the term 'scienter' refers to a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."'"

29

Obus, 693 F.3d at 288; see also Langevoort, supra note 28, at 455-58.

Allison M. Vissichelli, Intent to Recondle. SEC v. Obus, The Second Circuit's Edification of the Tippee
ScienterStandard,62 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 776 (2013).
30

[1]here is a degree of incongruity in the Second Circuit's approach, as it would seem that
a tippee, who only negligently knew of the tipper's breach, could not then knowingly
trade on the basis of improper information if the information is only made improper by
the breach. In other words, the negligence standard annuls the actual or reckless
knowledge standard in that a tippee may knowingly or recklessly trade on information
without knowing that the information is of the type of which the Act and accompanying
Rule prohibit trading. Such an effect would be contrary to insider trading regulation's
foundation in common law fraud and to its purpose of protecting the stability of the
securities market.

Id.
31 Ernst 6

Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. The Court expressly ducks the question of whether
recklessness is sufficient to constitute the requisite intentional behavior: "In certain areas of the
law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing
liability for some act. We need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances,
reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Id. Subsequent
federal court decisions addressing the issue generally find recklessness sufficient as a standard of
liability. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 1977); In
reIntelligroup Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 262, 282 (D.N.J. 2007); American General Ins. Co. v.
Equitable General Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 745 n.51 (E.D. Va. 1980). The conception of
recklessness varies from case to case, however. See Langevoort, supra note 28, at 436-37.
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In point of fact, conduct must be manipulative or deceptive in order to
violate § 10(b).32 Accordingly, fraudulent conduct is only actionable under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 if manipulative or deceptive.33 Insider trading violates § 10(b)
because it is deceptive; the deception arises from the maintenance of silence in
the face of a duty to disclose.34 One can intentionally or recklessly trade while in
knowing possession of information obtained from a person who breaches a duty
to shareholders or others without having the intent to deceive shareholders or an
information source.3" Presumably, a person in Cohen's position-the principal of
a securities trading firm-obtains information directly and indirectly from a
variety of sources before making a trading decision. Who does Cohen deceive if
he closes his eyes to the origin of some or all of the material nonpublic
information he possesses at the time he authorizes or finances a related securities
transaction?
Leaving Obus aside, it may be that fund principals like Cohen can
construct an information gathering and trading operation that relies on the willful
blindness of the principals, enabling them to avoid insider trading liability as
tippees. Willful blindness is addressed under the criminal law doctrine of
conscious avoidance, which may support a conviction on the basis of willful
misconduct.36 The applicable standard comes from a 2011 Supreme Court case,
Global-Tech Appliances Inc. v. SEB SA. 37 In that case, the Court articulates a

standard (based on appellate court decisions) that has two component parts and
32

See 15 U.S.C

§ 78j(b) (2012) (making it unlawful "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the

purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.").
33 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977).

The Santa Fe Court, in a decision that
followed Ernst & Ernst by just a year (and cited to Ernst & Erns), was quite explicit on this point:
The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any
conduct not involving manipulation or deception. Nor have we been cited to
any evidence in the legislative history that would support a departure from the
language of the statute. "When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of
manipulation and deception, . . . and when its history reflects no more

expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute."
Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
34 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654-55 (1997) (describing this "deception through

nondisclosure").
35 See generally Santa Fe Indus., 430
36

U.S. at 473.

See, e.g., United States v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2013).

37 Global-Tech Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2070-71 (2011).
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clarifies that, under the standard, negligent or reckless conduct is insufficient to
support liability.
While the Courts of Appeals articulate the doctrine of willful
blindness in slightly different ways, all appear to agree on two
basic requirements: (1) the defendant must subjectively believe

that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the
defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that

fact. We think these requirements give willful blindness an
appropriately limited scope that surpasses recklessness and
negligence. Under this formulation, a willfully blind defendant is
one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high
probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have
actually known the critical facts. By contrast, a reckless defendant
is one who merely knows of a substantial and unjustified risk of
such wrongdoing, and a negligent defendant is one who should
38
have known of a similar risk but, in fact, did not[.]
Although insider trading liability may be civil or criminal in nature, the scienter
requirement, which exists in both civil and criminal claims, relies on intentional
behavior.3 9 Accordingly, the willful blindness doctrine may be applied by a court
in insider trading actions alleging that a tippee should have known of the germane
breach of duty.4"
38 Id. (footnote and citations omitted). In Global-Tech, the Court explained the willful blindness
doctrine as follows:
The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in criminal law. Many
criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully,
and courts applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants
cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves
from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the
circumstances. The traditional rationale for this doctrine is that defendants
who behave in this manner are just as culpable as those who have actual
knowledge. It is also said that persons who know enough to blind themselves
to direct proof of critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of those facts.
Id. at 2068-69 (citation omitted).
39 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 216 (1976) (Blackmun, J. and Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
40 A recent criminal insider trading case, citing to Obus, makes this point.

See United States v,

Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y, 2012) ("[W]here appropriate ....the Government
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In the event that the willful blindness doctrine is applied in the insider
trading context (and perhaps even under other doctrines used to address when a
tippee should have known of a relevant breach of duty), the court will have to
address the circumstances under which an alleged violator "subjectively believe[s]
that there is a high probability that a fact exists." 4 1 In other words, the court will
have to assess the attributes of the factual context that may constitute the
requisite subjective belief of the tippee that material nonpublic information has
been received from an informant who has breached a duty of trust and
confidence. 42
Among these attributes are the professional and personal
background of the tippee, the type of information received, and the size and
nature of the operations of the securities trading firm. Even assuming a court
finds the required subjective belief, the court must then go on to find that the
tippee has taken "deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact" 4 3-the fact that
material nonpublic information has been received from an informant who has
breached a duty of trust and confidence. In short, these elements may be difficult
for public and private enforcement agents to prove. And the relevant facts may
be easy to manipulate to the advantage of putative tippees.
Most would be surprised (if not scandalized) to learn that existing U.S. law
may allow individuals to structure a securities trading businesses in a manner that
shields them from individual, personal liability. To some extent, this (perhaps
undesirable) result reflects the circumstances and policies at play in Dirks, a
Supreme Court decision made in a different era-an era that preceded the
information superhighway of today-applying insider trading law to an unusual
set of facts (involving disclosure of fraudulent conduct within a corporation by a
former officer and current employees of that corporation). The tippee liability
rule in Dirks derives in large part from a desire to protect the entrepreneurial hunt
for information in connection with securities trading transactions.44
In
formulating this rule, the Court explicitly credited this policy objective.
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an
insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the
is entitled to a 'willful blindness' or 'conscious avoidance' instruction to the jury on the issue of
such knowledge.").
41See Global-Tech, 131 S.Ct. at 2070.
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 See Dirks v. United States, 463 U.S. 658-59 (1983); see also Langevoort, supra note 28, at 433

(noting and critiquing this asserted policy).
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role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is
necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.
It is
commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information,"
and this often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate
officers and others who are insiders. And information that the
analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the
market worth of a corporation's securities.
The analyst's
judgment in this respect is made available in market letters or
otherwise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the
corporation's stockholders or the public generally.4"
Although this reasoning lays the foundation for the rule in Dirks, the law
on selective disclosure to analysts has changed since Dirks was decided. In 2000,
the SEC adopted Regulation FD, which requires issuers to publicly disclose any
material nonpublic information conveyed to market professionals and other
specified people.46 This required public disclosure must be simultaneous for
intentional disclosures and prompt for unintentional disclosures.47
Regulation FD specifically addresses the potential interactions of its
provisions with insider trading and other laws and regulations applicable to
securities trading by corporate insiders. As a general matter, Regulation FD is not
intended to change existing fraud and other misstatements liability or reporting
requirements. For example, Regulation FD provides that "[n]o failure to make a
public disclosure required solely by § 243.100 shall be deemed to be a violation of
Rule 10b-5 (17 CFR 240.10b-5) under the Securities Exchange Act. '4 In addition,
compliance with reporting obligations under the 1934 Act and public information
requirements in Rule 144 under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, are not
affected by the failure to comply with the public disclosure requirements of
Regulation FD.49

45Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
46

17 C.F.R. 243.100(a) (2013).

47Id.
48

17 C.F.R. 243.102.

49See 17 C.F.R. § 243.103.
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Notwithstanding the lack of a direct liability connection between
Regulation FD and insider trading liability, the adoption of Regulation FD and
the practices engendered by it over the past thirteen years have changed the
nature of an analyst's work and curbed the information entrepreneurialism of
market intermediaries. In light of this sea change (if it represents one) and the
prevalence of expert network insider trading, is it right to allow securities trading
firm principals like Cohen to avoid liability because they can plausibly deny the
origins of material nonpublic information that underlies securities trading
undertaken at their behest or for their financial benefit? The SAC prosecution
and Cohen enforcement proceedings present an opportunity for us to take a new
look at this old question and discuss where the law of insider trading should beand why-as a matter of policy. If insider trading regulation and liability is to
have any coherence in an era of expert networks, we must address and resolve
this question.

